Original and penetrating, this book investigates of the notion of inference from signs, which played a central role in ancient philosophical and scientific method. It examines an important chapter in ancient epistemology: the debates about the nature of evidence and of the inferences based on it--or signs and sign-inferences as they were called in antiquity. As the first comprehensive treatment of this topic, it fills an important gap in the histories of science and philosophy.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:PRZYWARA AND VON BALTHASAR ON ANALOGY ERICK PRZYWARA'S major work is entitled Analogia Entis: Metaphysil:,, Ur-Struktur und All-Rhythmus.1 As we will explain, it is especially the subtitle, " Basicstructure and Overall-rhythm", which is important in understanding the type of metaphysics he proposes. An explicit treatment of analogy by Hans Urs von Balthasar may be found in a se:des of two articles, " Analogie und Dialektik " and " Analogie (...) und Natur ", both of which carry the subtitle, " A clarification of the theological principles of Karl Barth " (1944-1945).2 They later become the basis of two important sections of Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung Seiner Theologie.3 The first becomes part of Balthasar's demonstration on Barth's "turn to analogy ".4 The second becomes part of presentation of Catholic" thought-form": "The concept of nature in Catholic theology". This context, the dialogue with Barth and Catholic theology in relationship to Barth, is essential for understanding Balthas,ar's views on analogy-as well as his relationship to Erich Przywara, anotheT dialogue partner of Barth. The "one concrete order of salvation", as 1 Anafogia En-tis. (AE) Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag, 1962. Second edition. The first edition (Munich: Koesel & Pustet, 1932), however, lacks this subtitle. It is called: Analogia Entis. JJfetaphysik. I. Prinzip. The new subtitle is a response to a "misunderstanding" (e.g., Barth's accusation) that analogia entis was only a metaphysical principle. Przywara also clarifies the sense in which analogy can be called a "principle" in the new forward to the second edition (p. 5), as well as in a new ending on p. 210. 2Both in Divus Thomas: the first in #22 (1944), 171-216; the second in # 23 (1945)' 3-56. 3 Cologne: Jakob Hegner Verlag, 1951. 4Cf. "Die Wendung zur.Analogie", 93-123; as well as "Die Vollgestalt der Analogie", 124-180. Balthasar acknowledges his indebtedness to Przywara in the enlarged treatment of analogy in Barth: cf. p. 10 ancl p. 404 n.3 (for the section on the" concept of nature in Catholic theology.") 473 474 JAMES V. ZEITZ, S.J. the place where analogy thinking must begin and end, is typical of both Przywarn and Balthasar-and reflects undoubtedly the influence of Barth on bot1h of these Catholic and (at the time) Jesuit theologians. To start at an earlier stage, however, the real issue of analogy, in both Przywa;ra and Balthasar's writings is the God question. How can we maintain God's transcendence as a true ' other ' in relation to immanence-the one concrete order where Jesus Christ is already present? This is first of all a prroblem for any theological method. The starting point and language which proceeds from this starting point must allow for transcendence within immanence. Thus Balthasar's aibove-mentioned work on analogy discusses the problem using the rubric of the time, a " concept of nacbure " in relationship to Ubernatur. His question is: what concept of nature is able bo relate to Ubernatur, while remaining truly a creaturely concept of nature? His thesis is that nature cannot be abstract or "pure " in an 18th century, secularized philosophical sense (e.g. Baius), but-in conformity with the whole tradition of the Ohurch Fathers, where nature means the whole human condition-the concept of nature is always already analogous, since ' rnan ' as creature can never stand aside from his already given, concrete nature within the order of salvation.5 Przywara had already prepared the way for this by insisting on a creaturely metaphysics leading to a theological metaphysics, where analogy is the adequate method. Besides the theological method, however, there is the problem of transcendence within one's understanding of Christ and the biblical revelation of the New Testament. Is there really a place for what can only be revealed and received? Or, to state the question in Balthasar's terms: how is the "one, concrete order", where Jesus Christ is already pa,rt of our history, 5 Cf. "Der Begriff der Natur in der Theologie ". Eine Diskussion zwischen Hans Urs von Balthasar und Engelbert Gutwenger. ZKTh vol. 75, 1953. 452461. In this debate, Balthasar further clarifies what he had said in Durstellung, in response to Gutwenger... (shrink)

When William James spoke about belief to the philosophy clubs of Yale and Brown in 1896, he forewarned his audience of the nature of his comments by describing them as a “sermon on justification by faith” (James 13), titling the talk “The Will to Believe.” Although there is disagreement about the substance of James’s remarks, it is fairly innocuous to assert that James thought they were appropriate because of the prevalence of the “logical spirit” of many (...) of those who practiced academic philosophy that led them to the conclusion that religious faith was untenable. Aware of his audience, James presents his view on the permissibility of religious faith on the terms and grounds familiar to professional philosophers. .. (shrink)

In this book, distinguished theologian and political scientist James V. Schall explores Maritain's political philosophy, demonstrating that Maritain understood society, state, and government in the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas, of natural law and human rights and duties. Schall pays particular attention to the ways in which evil appears in political forms, and how this evil can be dealt with morally.

Annalisa Coliva (Int J Study Skept 10(3–4):346–366, 2020) asks, “Are there mathematical hinges?” I argue here, against Coliva’s own conclusion, that there are. I further claim that this affirmative answer allows a case to be made for taking the concept of a hinge to be a useful and general-purpose tool for studying mathematical practice in its real complexity. Seeing how Wittgenstein can, and why he would, countenance mathematical hinges additionally gives us a deeper understanding of some of his latest thoughts (...) on mathematics. For example, a view of how mathematical hinges relate to Wittgenstein’s well-known river-bed analogy enables us to see how his way of thinking about mathematics can account nicely for a “dynamics of change” within mathematical research—something his philosophy of mathematics has been accused of missing (e.g., by Robert Ackermann (Wittgenstein’s city, The University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1988) and Mark Wilson (Wandering significance: an essay on conceptual behavior, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). Finally, the perspective on mathematical hinges ultimately arrived at will be seen to provide us with illuminating examples of how our conceptual choices and theories can be ungrounded but nevertheless the right ones (in a sense to be explained). (shrink)

v. 1. Thucydides through Machiavelli.--v. 2. Machiavelli through Marx.--v. 3. Marx through Marcuse.

Friendship is prominently mentioned, to be sure, in the great books, including very often the great books in political philosophy. In addition to Aristotle, whose treatise on friendship remains unsurpassed as a philosophic examination of this exalted topic, we recall Cicero's great essay De Amicitia, Plato's Phaedrus, plus numerous references in The Republic, The Laws, The Symposium, and many other central dialogues. The Gospel of John contains the great tractate on friendship at the Last Supper just before the Trial of (...) Christ, an intellectual association between politics and friendship that is itself cause of the deepest human reflection. The topic of friendship is most familiar to Augustine and Aquinas and later to Montaigne and Francis Bacon. In short, if we moderns and post-moderns might perhaps have difficulty in associating the notions of friendship and political philosophy, our intellectual tradition did not. (shrink)

In Roman Catholic Political Philosophy author James V. Schall tries to demonstrate that Roman Catholicism and political philosophy—-revelation and reason—are not contradictory. It is his contention that political philosophy, the primary focus of the book, asks certain questions about human purpose and destiny that it cannot, by itself, answer. Revelation is the natural complement to these important questions about God, human being, and the world. Schall manages to avoid polemicism or triumphalism as he shows that revelation and political thought (...) contribute to a fuller understanding of each other. (shrink)

In _The Life of the Mind,_ Georgetown University’s James V. Schall takes up the task of reminding us that, as human beings, we naturally take a special delight and pleasure in simply knowing. Because we have not only bodies but also minds, we are built to know what is. In this volume, Schall, author of _On the Unseriousness of Human Affairs __,_ among many other volumes of philosophical and political reflection, discusses the various ways of approaching the delight of (...) thinking and the way that this delight begins in seeing and hearing and even in making and walking. We must be attentive to and cultivate the needs of the mind, argues Schall, for it is through our intellect that all that is not ourselves is finally returned to us, allowing us to live in the light of truth. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:TRANSCENDENT MAN IN THE LIMITED CITY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES N. R. McCOY ]AMES v. SCHALL, S.J. Georgetown University Washington, D. C. The history of political philosophy since the time of St. Thomas has been a history of successive failures to relate ethics to politics and of successive attempts to find a substitute for theology, either in politics itself... or in economics.... Men are today oppressed by false (...) theologies erected into political systems, and those who are not so oppressed are in risk of becoming so oppressed by an intellectual and moral inability to defend themselves. St. Thomas's political science will not give us the answers to problems of hydro-electric development or technological unemployment ; but it will give us the answer to the most vital of contemporary problems: how to secure the rational foundations of humane living. -Charles N. R. McCoy," St. Thomas and Political Science." 1 I IN WRITING ABOUT the small but rich corpus in political philosophy by Charles N. R. McCoy, the temptation is almost irresistible to call it, wittily, " The Real McCoy," or, more academically, a theoretic essay on the reasons for our " intellectual and moral inability to defend ourselves." The kind of being we are, no doubt, needs defense, needs an explication that justifies its unique givenness. Charles N. R. McCoy is not generally wellknown, though he has a small and (one hopes) growing number of admirers. The very cultural unlikelihood of his central theme, 1 On the Intelligibility of Political Philosophy: Essays of Charles N. R. McCoy, edited by James V. Schall, S.J. and John J. Schrems (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1989), p. 38. 63 64 JAMES V. SCHALL, S.J. which 1s m no sense Hegelian, that there is indeed a coherent philosophical intelligibility-a "structure "-to political philosophy, makes his work both unique, profoundly appealing, and perhaps even prophetic. McCoy was concerned to explain the transcendence of each person, each citizen, beyond the city, indeed beyond this world, without denying his exact political nature and the reasons for its limits. Man was both a political and a philosophical animal to whom more than either politics or philosophy was given. The dignity of the city was essentially revealed in its limits, in what good it could do with its own means while leaving other admitted goods untouched, in what questions it could legitimately bring up because of its experienced life, but still could not answer by itself. On reading him carefully in one's own pursuit of philosophic wisdom in an age replete with sundry mental and moral confusions, it is tempting to affirm that, at last, in political philosophy here is found a body of reflection which is indeed " the real McCoy." Here is a consistent examination of philosophic principle that accounts for the contours of the whole of the discipline in its most radical origins and clearest limits. McCoy's "reality" does not, to be sure, exist for most of the political science profession itself nor for Christian thinkers in the field of political thought. This situation is unfortunate on both counts. Political philosophy, for its part, has pursued in modern times the line of its own autonomy in rejecting the great tradition which affirmed the limited place of politics in the order of being, its position as a practical, not speculative science. Theology-itself seeking relevance in lieu of transcendence-has largely imitated this modern turn in political thought. The crisis in theology is, more than anything else, the result of a crisis in political philosophy, its evolution in modernity. Thus in a discipline in which so many of the ultimate human issues are either not confronted at all or are at best confused, in a theological environment which is itself largely infected with the theoretical deviations McCoy chronicled, this benign neglect of his work may turn out to be an advantage. McCoy's independence of these ideological movements, grounded POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES N. R. MC COY 65 as it is in the philosophical tradition from which these movements systematically deviated, provides a new and fresh way of coming to terms with the meaning of political philosophy itself. In a spirit of... (shrink)

Additional theorizing about mathematical practice is needed in order to ground appeals to truly useful notions of the virtues in mathematics. This paper aims to contribute to this theorizing, first, by characterizing mathematical practice as being epistemic and “objectual” in the sense of Knorr Cetina The practice turn in contemporary theory, Routledge, London, 2001). Then, it elaborates a MacIntyrean framework for extracting conceptions of the virtues related to mathematical practice so understood. Finally, it makes the case that Wittgenstein’s methodology for (...) examining mathematics and its practice is the most appropriate one to use for the actual investigation of mathematical practice within this MacIntyrean framework. At each stage of thinking through mathematical practice by these means, places where new virtue-theoretic questions are opened up for investigation are noted and briefly explored. (shrink)

For each of the N-values 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, and 1,024, 50,000 samples of size N were drawn from an L-shaped population, and for each sample the Z and t statistics were calculated. The resulting distributions of 50,000 Z or t values at each sample size were then used to study the robustness of left-tailed, right-tailed, and two-tailed Z and t tests at α levels of.05,.01, and.001 (and, for Z only,.0001). The actually obtained proportion, ρ, (...) of Type I errors was often far greater or far smaller than the nominal proportion, α. Furthermore, although α is the expected value of ρ at infinite N, no N-value below 512 ever brought the deviation of p from α to within 10% of α for any t tests or one-tailed Z tests. (shrink)

The optimal-pessimal paradox (Bradley, 1975) has been criticized on bizarre grounds by Childs (1980). Assumptions that it never made were attributed to it and attacked. Empirical evidence for its existence (which occupied a large portion of the criticized article) was totally ignored, and it was treated as a mere theoretically based conjecture. Originally proposed solutions to the problems it presents were dismissed and replaced by ineffectual alternatives. In spite of Childs’ claim that “the paradox, although theoretically sound, is grounded upon (...) assumptions that are empirically untenable,” the paradox makes no such assumptions and is an empirical fact. (shrink)

The robustness of the classical tests on means (Z, t, and F) and variances (chi square and F) was investigated by obtaining 30,000 (or, sometimes, 10,000 or 150,000) values of the test statistic under assumption-violating conditions and comparing the actual proportion of Type I errors with the proportion expected when all assumptions are met. The sampling and testing conditions investigated were: population shape (L-shape or bell-shape), relative population variance (1 or 4), sample size (8, 16, or 24), nominal significance level (...) (.05,.01, or.001), and location of rejection region (left-tailed, right-tailed, or two-tailed). All tests on means were nonrobust under most of the investigated conditions, and one was nonrobust under all of them. Both tests on variances were extremely nonrobust under virtually all conditions. The worst nonrobustness of the one- and two-independent-sample Z and t tests rivaled or exceeded that of the notoriously nonrobust chi-square and F tests on variances. (shrink)

No other volume has this scope. Students in bioethics, public and international health, and ethics will find this book particularly useful.

The alleged robustness of Z, t, and F tests against nonnormality and, when sample sizes are equal, of t and F tests against heterogeneity as well was investigated in a large-scale sampling study under conditions realistic to experimentation and testing in the behavioral sciences. Factors varied were: population shape (L or bell), σ1/σ2 (1/2, 1, or 2), size N of smallest sample (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, or 1,024), N1/N2 (1/3,1/2,1, 2, or 3), α (.05,.01, or.001), (...) and test tailedness (left, right, or two). In about 25% of the situations investigated, the test failed to meet a very lax criterion for robustness at every examined N value less than 100, and in 8% at every value less than 1,000; no test met the criterion in all of the situations studied before N=512. Robustness was strongly influenced by all of the factors investigated, and interactions among the influencing factors were often strong and complex. (shrink)

Initially, let me say that no man can write anything about Chesterton's Orthodoxy that will be better than reading or re-reading Orthodoxy itself. But the glory of the sun ought not to prevent us from seeing what is in its light. Indeed, if we see only the sun, we will see nothing else, which not seeing is neither the point of the sun nor of Chesterton. The temptation to “explain” Chesterton better than Chesterton explained himself is the hazard that comes (...) with loving Chesterton. Though under no illusions, I freely confess to having succumbed to this insidious enticement frequently as…. (shrink)

Simple hypotheses are intrinsically attractive, and, for this reason, need to be formulated with utmost precision if they are to be testable. Unfortunately, it is hard to see how Phillips & Singer's hypothesis might be unambiguously refuted. Despite this, the authors have provided much evidence consistent with the hypothesis, and have proposed a natural and powerful extension for information theoretic approaches to learning.

Adding the phrase “Roman Catholic” to “political philosophy” implies that political philosophy is a work of reason that, in its own order, reaches legitimate issues and problems that it cannot itself resolve. This phrase suggests that, contained within revelation, are responses to the unanswered issues as posed in political philosophy. These responses suggest that there is a coherent relation between reason and revelation that arises directly out of political philosophy as such.

This article seeks to expand the sociology of religion’s conceptual toolkit beyond the focus on religious belief and on organizational structures inherited from Western Christianity. After criticizing these origins, I use Ibn Khaldûn’s notion of al ‘assabiyyah or “group-feeling” to analyze the events surrounding the Marian apparitions at Medjugorje, Bosnia, in the 1980s and the later events in the same region during the 1990s Bosnian wars. This concept’s strength is its ability to treat religious and ethnic solidarity as part of (...) the same phenomenon—something that previous literature on Medjugorje and the Bosnian war failed to do. Its weakness is its focus on centripetal solidarity rather than solidarity created by heightened social boundaries. The solidarities at Medjugorje were more often of the latter kind. (shrink)

ExcerptSOCRATES: But if I come to my end because of a deficiency in flattering oratory, I know that you'd see me bear my death with ease. For no one who isn't totally bereft of reason and courage is afraid to die; doing what's unjust is what he's afraid of. For of all evils, the ultimate is that of arriving in Hades with one's soul stuffed full of unjust actions. Plato, Gorgias, 523d–e1 SOCRATES: Maybe you [Callicles] think this account [eschatological myth] (...) is told as an old wives' tale, and you feel contempt for it. And it…. (shrink)

Introduction: "A certain crime unobserved" -- On Catholic thinking -- The mind that is Catholic -- "Infinitized by the spirit" : Maritain and the intellectual vocation -- Chesterton, the real "heretic" : "the outstanding eccentricity of the peculiar sect called Roman Catholics" -- "The very graciousness of being" -- Reckoning with Plato -- On the uniqueness of Socrates : political philosophy and the rediscovery of the human body -- On the death of Plato : some philosophical thoughts on the Thracian (...) Maidens -- What is piety? -- The abiding implications of friendship -- Aristotle on friendship -- The totality of society : from justice to friendship -- The Trinity : God is not alone -- The medieval experience -- The point of medieval political philosophy -- "Possessed of both a reason and a revelation" -- Aquinas and the defense of ordinary things : on "what common men call common sense" -- Implications of Catholic thought -- The "realism" of St. Augustine's "political realism" : Augustine and Machiavelli -- "Mystifying indeed" : on being fully human -- Transcendence and political philosophy -- Mysticism, political philosophy, and play -- Things practical and impractical -- Sports and philosophy -- The real alternatives to just war -- Where does it lead? -- On choosing not to see -- The ultimate meaning of existence -- "The beginning of the real story" -- Conclusion: On being allowed to read Monte Cristo. (shrink)